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For his honorary conference, my dear friend Michael Risinger has once 
again articulated his distrust of “formalism” in the context of using 
probability theory and the associated decision theory as tools for the 
modeling and analysis of evidence and inference at trial.  In their place, he 
suggests recourse to the concept of “potential surprise,” and he begins to 
articulate how this concept could be used to explain the standards of proof 
to fact-finders.1 
In my comment on Michael’s suggestion, I begin by making a few 
comments about formalism and its relevance to Michael’s thesis.  Then I will 
turn to the concept of potential surprise and ask how recourse to this idea 
might advance the project of understanding and improving our practices 
regarding the burdens of proof.2  I suggest that appreciation of the formal 
properties of potential surprise suggests lines of inquiry that can help us to 
decide whether it provides the basis of a superior model. 
 
 
 
 
* Albert J. Weatherhead III & Richard W. Weatherhead Professor of Law, Case Western 
Reserve University School of Law. 
1 D. Michael Risinger, Leveraging Surprise: What Standards of Proof Imply That We Want 
from Jurors, and What We Should Say to Them to Get It, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 965 (2018). 
 2  In the course of my discussion, I will cite various parts of my recent book on the 
burdens of proof, which I cite for convenient reference here. See DALE A. NANCE, THE 
BURDENS OF PROOF: DISCRIMINATORY POWER, WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE, AND TENACITY OF 
BELIEF (2016). 
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I. THE IMPORTANCE OF FORMALISM IN THE ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE 
In an earlier article, Michael summarized his perspective on formalism 
in the analysis of evidence in this succinct passage: 
 
Formal symbolization, and its common implication of an 
underlying mathematizability, has great and fecund power when 
something approaching defensible numerical values are or can be 
made available.  This power is what justifies the loss in general 
access to meaning for many people which rendering things in 
specialized symbolic language entails.  But when such defensible 
numerical values are not available and are not likely to become 
available, then symbolization can easily become an act of 
mystification with very little benefit and the potential for much 
mischief.3 
 
I readily concede the “potential for much mischief” to which Michael 
refers, though in truth all theory has such potential.  But I think Michael 
understates the value of formalization in referring (albeit obliquely) only to 
its computational potential.  In the present paper, to be sure, Michael 
qualifies this point in an important way by stating: 
 
While formal probability theory does have practical lessons to 
teach that may help to either explain or to criticize and improve 
the trial process in various ways, my view has always been that 
those lessons come by way of analogy, and that absent the 
availability of hard data, one must be suspicious of models that 
need to be supplied with cardinal numbers to work.4 
 
Unfortunately, Michael does not elucidate the idea of “lessons by way 
of analogy.”  What follows may (or may not) be part of what he has in mind 
in this regard. 
Suppose that two variables, x and y, are in a relationship of 
proportionality, as indicated by the standard formalization: 
 
y = mx 
 
for some positive constant m.  Now it might seem that, in order to employ a 
descriptive or prescriptive model using such a relationship, one would have 
to have what Michael refers to as “hard data” about the values of at least two 
 
 3  D. Michael Risinger, Against Symbolization, 11 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 247, 248 
(2012).   
 4  Risinger, supra note 1, at 968.   
NANCE (DO NOT DELETE) 8/8/2018  12:44 PM 
2018] FORMALISM AND POTENTIAL SURPRISE 1019 
of these, such as m and x, in order to generate a value for the third, in this 
case y.  But such a proportionality model can be useful even if one does not 
know the exact or even approximate values of the variables.  For example, 
suppose that one can confidently say that, for two values of x, say x1 and x2, 
that x2 > x1, even though one cannot say what the values of x1 and x2 are.  
Knowing only that m is positive, the model permits certain inferences about 
the corresponding values of y, viz. y1 and y2.  Specifically, one can infer that 
y2 > y1.  Such inferences about purely ordinal relationships can be quite 
useful.5 
Indeed, little more is needed to make important use of the probability-
based decision-theoretic model for standards of proof at trial.  By one 
articulation of how to apply the model to adjudication, that model requires 
only (1) that the law-making authorities—not the fact-finder—settle on some 
value, call it r, representing the ratio of the disutility of a false-positive 
decision to the disutility of a false-negative decision, and (2) that the fact-
finder be able to determine whether the ratio of the probability that the claim 
is true to the probability that the claim is false (that is, the odds on the claim) 
is greater than r.6  This does not require the fact-finder to determine a specific 
value for either probability, nor does it even require the fact-finder to 
determine a specific value for their ratio (the odds); it requires only that the 
fact-finder be able to say that the odds exceed r. While I agree with Michael 
in opposing “unwarranted cardinality,”7 it is difficult to see how asking the 
fact-finder to assess whether the odds that a claim is true are greater than a 
certain ratio—for example, 1:1, 2:1, or 5:1—involves an unwarranted 
degree of cardinality.8  Of course, a variety of considerations may motivate 
the law-making authority to use less precise verbal predicates for the value 
of r, which reduces the degree of cardinality further.9  But it is not 
implausible to identify an r of 1:1 as grounding the “preponderance of the 
evidence” standard, or to identify an r of 2:1 or 3:1 as grounding the “clear 
and convincing evidence” standard, or to identify an r of 4:1 or 5:1 as 
 
 5  Michael seems to be comfortable with the idea of ordinal rankings.  See Risinger, 
supra note 1, at 981. 
 6  To be sure, the first part of this task is rather more complicated than this description 
suggests, but the details do not affect the point being made here.  See NANCE, supra note 2, at 
21–42. 
 7  Risinger, supra note 1, at 978. 
 8  Keep in mind that the fact-finder does not set the ratio; some law-making authority 
does. That lawmakers are capable of doing so is no more problematic in principle, though it 
may be more complicated in practice, than that they can meaningfully set a certain number as 
the minimum age for a driver’s license or the right to vote.  Such numbers involve complex 
considerations and, once selected, are no doubt over- and under-inclusive in application to 
some particular cases, but that is not necessarily a fatal defect of the enterprise.  See generally 
FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES (2003). 
 9  See Nance, supra note 2, at 30, 40–42. 
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grounding the “beyond reasonable doubt” standard.10 
In saying that such ratios do not involve unwarranted cardinality, I am 
primarily replying to what I take to be one of Michael’s main concerns, 
related to the way in which fact-finders can express their degrees of certainty 
and whether this can or should take a quantitative form.  But there are other 
senses in which the use of such ratios might be thought to entail unwarranted 
cardinality.  In particular, it might be thought that, even if such a ratio can be 
estimated by the fact-finder, at least in the comparative terms described 
above, still not all of what we are concerned about in the assessment of proof 
can be captured by such a judgment.  I actually think there is much to be said 
in favor of such an argument, but it does not necessarily entail abandoning 
such comparative assessments of probability. (Indeed, it is an objection to 
any theory of the standards of proof that is purely comparative, but does not 
necessarily entail abandoning tests of comparative assessment.)  Rather, it 
involves recognizing that such requirements on comparative assessments of 
probability (or plausibility, or whatever) must be coupled with distinct 
requirements on what might be called the degree of completeness of the 
evidence presented to the fact-finder, the evidence upon which the 
comparative assessment is made.  In other words, even if the claimant’s case 
is sufficiently more likely than the defendant’s, that may be a conclusion that 
is derived from evidence that is less thoroughly developed than it should be, 
given the nature of the case, an idea that generates a distinct component of 
the burden of proof.  I have elaborated on this idea elsewhere.11 
 
 10  With regard to the criminal law standard, an r of 4:1 is equivalent to requiring a 
probability of guilt of about 0.80, which may seem low to many commentators.  And it may 
be low as a prescriptive matter.  But as a description of jury behavior under the “beyond 
reasonable doubt” instruction, it may be fairly accurate, even high, at least for some categories 
of prosecutions.  In this regard, empirical studies of mock jurors have devised ways to 
ascertain at what level of assessed probability a criminal conviction becomes likely.  See, e.g., 
Dale A. Nance & Scott B. Morris, Juror Understanding of DNA Evidence: An Empirical 
Assessment of Presentation Formats for Trace Evidence with a Relatively Small Random-
Match Probability, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 395, 407 (2005) (estimating the minimum pre-
deliberation assessed probability for a stranger-rape conviction in the specific case as falling 
between 0.75 and 0.85); David H. Kaye, Valerie P. Hans, B. Michael Dann, Erin J. Farley & 
Stephanie Albertson, Statistics in the Jury Box: How Jurors Respond to Mitochondrial DNA 
Match Probabilities, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 797, 818–24 (2007) (estimating the 
minimum pre-deliberation-assessed probability for a robbery conviction in the specific case 
at 0.68).  
 11  See NANCE, supra note 2, ch. 4 (arguing, inter alia, that this distinct component should 
be associated with the burden of production, rather than the burden of persuasion).  Insofar as 
the use of surprise as the measure of uncertainty is also intended to incorporate considerations 
of evidential completeness, in the sense described in the text, it may involve what I have 
described as an attempt to combine into one “holistic” assessment two very different, indeed 
largely independent epistemic components of decision-making.  If so, this can only lead to 
confusion.  See id. at 156–78, 253–70.  Whether this is the case will depend on how the 
concept of surprise is developed. 
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Another point is equally important.  Formalism is no more inherent in 
probability theory and conventional decision theory than it is in the theory 
of potential surprise.  In particular, one may approach either probability or 
potential surprise in informal ways, using ordinary language, verbal 
analogies, and so forth.  Alternatively, one may approach either concept 
more formally, using the structured language of mathematics.  Michael is 
certainly aware of this, for he refers to the modern formal development of 
the theory of potential surprise under the name “possibility theory.”12  But 
he makes no explicit use of that theory.  For reasons that will appear below, 
I think this is unfortunate. In any event, it is not as if one flees the formality 
of probability by embracing the informality of potential surprise.  There are 
two distinct issues here: (1) how formal (or informal) one chooses to be in 
analyzing the concepts to be employed; and (2) which theory–probability, 
potential surprise, or some other measure of partial belief—is the most useful 
conception in this context.13 
With regard to the first issue, one encounters an unavoidable tension.  
On the one hand, if one wants to stay close to the language of the courtroom, 
there is reason to prefer informal understanding of terms like “probability,” 
“possibility,” and “surprise.”  On the other hand, formal theory is critical to 
understanding the strengths and weaknesses of the various alternative 
theories of partial belief being considered.  It is an effort to articulate the 
intellectual commitments that lie within our informal concepts, whether that 
be probability, potential surprise, or any other concept. Without that effort, 
for example, one can make just about any argument as well with probability 
language as with potential surprise language, and conversely.14  Thus, any 
event that has very low epistemic probability on the available evidence can 
be described as an event that, if discovered to be true, would cause great 
surprise to a rational person with that evidence, and any event of very high 
epistemic probability on the available evidence can be described as an event 
that, if discovered to be true, would cause very little surprise to a rational 
person with that evidence.15  In the end, without formal theory Michael’s 
 
 12  Risinger, supra note 1, at 981, n.49. 
 13  Michael clearly assumes that the law is focused on a gradational notion of strength of 
belief, not with what philosophers call “categorical” beliefs.  On this point, I agree.  See 
NANCE, supra note 2, at 278–91 (arguing that the law’s norms and structures do not fit a focus 
on categorical beliefs). 
 14  I suspect that one reason many lawyers, surely not including Michael, are hostile to 
formalism is that it functions to constrain the arguments that can be made.  Lawyers do not 
like that kind of rigor: they want to remain free to make any argument, no matter how 
incoherent, that they think nonetheless will be persuasive.  What is often called “thinking like 
a lawyer” is not a serious impediment to such practices. 
 15  The concept of an “epistemic probability” does not make much of an appearance in 
Michael’s paper.  Like many legal scholars, he seems to see probabilities as either frequentist 
or subjective.  Although that represents an improvement over those who see probabilities in 
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proposed move to potential surprise is likely to amount to little more than a 
change in terminology, with the attendant costs of doing so, but perhaps 
without an identifiable change in either the predicted or prescribed outcomes 
of cases.16 
Moreover, insofar as the use of potential surprise is intended as 
normative—not simply an effort to conform to the extant language or 
thought patterns of fact-finders and other courtroom actors, but intended to 
improve legal decisions, at least at the margin—formal theory helps to clarify 
what the use of the concept is intended to achieve.  Michael’s proposal is not 
entirely clear on the matter: he seems to be suggesting that potential surprise 
be used not only because it captures the actual thought processes of ordinary 
fact-finders, but also because the rational fact-finder should think in these 
terms. Thus, he writes that “when humans evaluate evidence and determine 
what they believe in regard to facts, the primary, though usually implicit, 
operator in those determinations is, or at least ought to be, the fundamental 
emotion of surprise.”17  So I take Michael’s enterprise to be neither wholly 
descriptive, nor wholly prescriptive, but rather an interpretive one. I now turn 
to the proposal itself. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
exclusively frequentist terms, these are still not the only alternatives, and, in my view, neither 
captures what is of importance in adjudication.  Epistemic probabilities are degrees of rational 
belief or degrees of justification of belief, which are more objective than subjective 
probabilities, but less objective than probabilities that are identified with frequencies or 
propensities in observable phenomena.  See NANCE, supra note 2, at 42–57. 
 16  For a discussion of potential differences, see the contribution to this conference by 
Matthew Ginther and Edward K. Cheng. Matthew Ginther & Edward K. Cheng, Surprise vs. 
Probability as a Metric for Proof, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1081 (2018). 
 17  Risinger, supra note 1, at 970. 
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II. POTENTIAL SURPRISE AS THE DETERMINANT UNDER THE BURDEN OF 
PERSUASION 
The three most commonly encountered standards of proof in 
litigation—”preponderance of the evidence,” “clear  and convincing 
evidence,” and “beyond a reasonable doubt”—can be interpreted as 
representing increasing levels of probability on the right side of a scale that 
look something like this:18 
 
0-----------|-----------|------------|-----------|-------------|------------|------------1 
 
 
Slightest 
Possibility 
 
Reasonable 
Possibility 
 
Substantial 
Possibility 
 
Equipoise 
 
Probability (or 
Preponderance) 
 
High 
Probability 
(or Clear 
and 
Convincing) 
 
Near 
Certainty (or 
Beyond a 
Reasonable 
Doubt) 
 
 
This interpretation bears an obvious relationship to the decision-
theoretic model.  That model provides a way to approach the allocation of 
the standard of proof among these tiers according to a rough weighting of 
the risks of error.19 
To be sure, the diagram is not without its difficulties.  Most importantly, 
there is a sense of “equipoise” that does not mean something like 
“probabilities for and against that are indistinguishably close to each other, 
and thus to 0.5.”  Equipoise should be distinguished from equi-probability. 
Equipoise should be understood as referring to any assessment of probability 
that is too close to a margin (any margin relevant under the applicable 
standard of proof) for the fact-finder to be able to say into which of two 
adjacent levels it falls.  Under such a conception, there should be a zone of 
equipoise between each of the other six levels of probability.  That is, there 
are five regions of equipoise, only one of which is functionally relevant 
under the given standard of proof.  For example, if the burden of proof is 
“beyond a reasonable doubt,” then the important cases of equipoise are those 
in which the fact-finder is unable to decide whether to place the case before 
it in the “beyond a reasonable doubt” category or in the “clear and 
convincing evidence” category.20 
 
 
 18  See, e.g., KEVIN M. CLERMONT, STANDARDS OF DECISION IN LAW 36 (2013).  
 19  See NANCE, supra note 2, at 57–63. 
 20  Another difficulty, significant given the present topic, is that the term “possibility” 
might be misunderstood: in the illustration, it should be understood as another term for degree 
of probability, not as the technical concept used in possibility theory, which is described 
below. 
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In any event, Michael would reject this approach.  He argues that the 
law’s references to what is “probable” do not necessarily mean probability 
in the formal sense—i.e., probabilities conforming to the Kolmogorov 
axioms of standard mathematical probability that are used in conventional 
decision theory.21  Instead, he proposes to center our attention on the concept 
of potential surprise, and he suggests a different, more elaborate scale of 
levels of potential surprise to capture the levels of partial belief with which 
the law is concerned.22  He explains that his “central claim is that people 
believe something to be true to the extent that they would be surprised to find 
out it was false.”23 
What motivates this proposal?  Michael gives two explanations.  The 
first relates to the goals of the law’s articulation of standards of proof. He 
writes: 
 
[W]hile I accept that standards of proof are the law’s attempt to 
impose a requirement of different degrees of belief for different 
kinds of issues, this does not mean that any statement about 
appropriate system performance over large numbers of cases was 
the purpose for the creation of those standards. Rather, it seems 
that the purpose of such standards at their creation was to define 
the level of subjective certainty necessary for such a decision to 
be a morally justified decision.24 
 
Thus, Michael’s rejection of the conventional decision-theoretic 
interpretation seems to be premised on a claim about what the purpose of the 
promulgation of such standards was “at their creation.” 
Insofar as this is correct, it seems to ignore two related points: first, a 
practice can continue long after its original purpose has been lost or 
forgotten, and for different reasons; and second, practices can be assessed 
and interpreted according to their functions even though those functions may 
not come to be understood until long after the practice is begun.  The 
interpretation of legal doctrine often presents these phenomena.  Except for 
the purest originalists, the origins of a doctrine are not determinative.  More 
importantly, Michael’s argument poses the following questions: On what 
basis would law-making authorities, then or now, think these standards of 
proof were or are pertinent to a “morally justified decision” if they do not 
speak to the relative weightings of error costs?  When uncertainty about the 
facts is the problem, what else is morally important?  Such relative 
 
 21  See Risinger, supra note 1, at 978. 
 22  Risinger, supra note 1, at 985 (diagram). 
 23  Risinger, supra note 1, at 981. 
 24  Risinger, supra note 1, at 980. 
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weightings are, of course, built into the decision-theoretic formulation.25  
They may be quite intuitive, moral weights, or they can be the product of 
more thorough legislative investigation, reflection, and debate.  In particular, 
the model does not assume (though it is compatible with) a focus on “system 
performance over a large number of cases.” 
These observations reflect a broader point.  Michael has not explained 
how the selection of a particular segment of, or position on, the scale of 
potential surprise is related to the moral justification of the resulting decision.  
Without the decision-theoretic model, one needs an alternative way to 
explain, at least in a rough way, the morality of selecting some standard of 
proof from the available options.  I understand his suggestion of using 
paradigmatic stories as exemplars of various levels of surprise,26 but even if 
such stories can be devised, it begs the question of how moral justification is 
associated with the selected stories, other than by intuition.27 
Indeed, we need some explanation about why the essentially epistemic 
enterprise of fact-finding in adjudication should be tied to what Michael 
regards as an emotion.28  The objection can be made that adjudication is 
supposed to be, to the extent possible, a rational enterprise, not an emotional 
one.  This is not a trivial problem, as much of the law of evidence is about 
channeling fact-finders toward rational and away from emotional responses.  
Moreover, the line between surprise and, say, anger or disgust must be 
difficult to draw consistently.  What one fact-finder might consider 
surprising, another might describe as disgusting.  To be sure, an emotional 
response can be used as a proxy for more rational epistemic measures we 
want adjudication to reflect, and potential surprise might be a plausible 
emotive proxy in this sense.  In what follows, I will assume that potential 
surprise can be understood as such an epistemic measure or at least as a proxy 
for one. 
 
 
 
 25  Obviously also important—and properly included in the decision-theoretic model—
are positive utilities associated with true positives and true negatives.  See NANCE, supra note 
2, at 23–25.  I put aside the important but minimal deontological constraint, deriving from the 
rule of law itself, that would limit the imposition of sanctions, whether civil or criminal, to 
those situations in which the claim is at least more likely than not true.  See NANCE, supra 
note 2, at 33.  I also put aside the possibility that controlling error costs might be subordinated 
to using standards of proof to send signals that control ex ante behavior.  See NANCE, supra 
note 2, at 64–73. 
 26  See Risinger, supra note 1, at 983. 
 27  It should also be observed that, if stories can be used to guide jurors in matching 
potential surprise to categories of required proof, the same presumably would be true for 
probability: one could also use stories designed to illustrate the levels of probability that match 
categories of required proof. 
 28  See Risinger, supra note 1, at 968 n.16. 
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Michael’s second argument is quite different.  It concerns how fact-
finders develop their degrees of partial belief and how the law elicits those 
partial beliefs from fact-finders so as to resolve disputes.  With regard to the 
former, Michael expresses a healthy skepticism about what he takes to be the 
Bayesian approach to a fact-finder’s process of arriving at the odds on a 
claim, namely, the explicit use of Bayes’s Theorem to revise the odds in light 
of the accumulating evidence.29  I am inclined to think this is a largely a straw 
man, though it is certainly a recurring one.  The convincing reply to this 
argument, available to someone who wants to insist on the usefulness of 
conventional decision theory, is to observe that there are many mental tools 
that a fact-finder will and should employ in attempting to assess a 
probability, or in this case, the relative probability that the legal claim is true 
as opposed to false (that is, the odds on the claim).  Among those tools may 
well be gauging one’s level of surprise were the claim to turn out false.  
Another might be the employment of an approximate probabilistic 
calculation using a more or less intuitive understanding of Bayesian 
principles.  These are clearly not the only possibilities.  The study of 
decision-making “heuristics”—more or less efficient mental shortcuts—has 
opened a broad field of possibilities regarding how fact-finders might go 
about assessing the odds on a claim.30  Indeed, Michael elsewhere endorses 
an appropriate eclecticism regarding models of inference.31 ).  In any event, 
there is nothing about the standard decision-theory model that requires the 
fact-finder to reach its assessment of the odds on the claim by explicitly 
Bayesian or any other quantitative methods.32 
What, then, about the latter part of this argument, regarding the law’s 
elicitation of the fact-finder’s resulting partial belief about the claim, 
however the fact-finder may have arrived at that partial belief?  As to this, 
Michael argues: 
 
 
 29  Risinger, supra note 1, at 971–77. 
 30  See, e.g., GERD GIGERENZER, PETER M. TODD, & THE ABC RESEARCH GROUP, SIMPLE 
HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART (1999). 
 31  See Risinger, supra note 1, at 968 n.6.  Few scholars, no matter how enamored of 
probabilistic approaches they may be, have seriously suggested requiring a computationally 
Bayesian approach by fact-finders to the assessment of every piece of evidence submitted at 
a trial.  The most common suggestion by those endorsing the applicability of probability 
principles has been that, in particular contexts, such as forensic science, it can be helpful to 
isolate an item of evidence and invite the fact-finder to analyze it using Bayesian principles.  
See, e.g., C.G.G. AITKEN & FRANCO TARONI, STATISTICS AND THE EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE 
FOR FORENSIC SCIENTISTS (2d ed. 2004).  
 32  See, e.g., Kevin Clermont, Standards of Proof Revisited, 33 VT. L. REV. 469, 470, 482–
85 (2009); Peter Tillers & Jonathan Gottfried, United States v. Copeland, 369 F. Supp. 2d 276 
(E.D.N.Y. 2005): A Collateral Attack on the Legal Maxim That Proof Beyond Reasonable 
Doubt is Unquantifiable?, 5 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 135, 142–43 (2006).  See also NANCE, 
supra note 2, at 84–95. 
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[T]he extent of surprise one would feel upon discovering a belief 
to be false is the best measure of subjective certainty, of the degree 
of belief.  I propose that a person’s own degree of belief is best 
revealed to his or her self not by the betting exercises usually 
invoked in Bayesian approaches such as decision theory, but by a 
different mental experiment—not by asking what one would bet 
on the truth of a belief, but asking directly how surprised one 
would be to find out that the thing believed was false.33 
 
What gives Michael’s proposal real bite is the implication that, 
whatever the inferential tools employed, all should be merely means to the 
end of gauging the fact-finder’s potential surprise, rather than the fact-
finder’s inevitably subjective assessment of epistemic probability or odds.  
To the extent that this is Michael’s thesis, and it appears to be, then several 
difficult questions emerge. 
Most importantly, the notion of potential surprise is not itself without 
controversy and confusion.  Michael draws on the work of G.L.S. Shackle, 
which has come to be understood as a progenitor of modern possibility 
theory.34  A little possibility theory turns out to be quite useful here.35 
An event or hypothesis is maximally potentially surprising just when it 
is minimally possible, and it is minimally potentially surprising just when it 
is maximally possible.  If one takes 0 as the measure of belief in an event or 
proposition that the decision-maker considers minimally possible 
(maximally surprising), and normalize (set to the value of 1) the measure of 
belief in an event or proposition that is maximally possible (minimally 
surprising), then possibility measures vary from 0 to 1 with pos(A) = 0 
interpreted as “A is impossible” (maximally surprising) while pos(A) = 1 
means that “A is perfectly possible” (not surprising at all).  In considering a 
set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses, complete ignorance is 
when all the hypotheses are completely possible, whereas complete 
knowledge is when all but one of the hypotheses are impossible (in which 
case the one hypothesis must be perfectly possible). 
Without getting too technical, the central premise of possibility theory 
can be identified this way.  If A is a collection of hypotheses or propositions 
(such as stories supporting a litigant), then possibility is that concept of 
partial belief that selects the most believable proposition from among those 
in A and attributes the same degree of belief to A that is attributed to the most 
believable proposition in A.  Thus, if A is some finite collection of stories, 
 
 33  See Risinger, supra note 1, at 981.   
 34  See Risinger, supra note 1, at 971–73. 
 35  For those interested, there is an excellent collection of papers on this and related 
subjects.  See DEGREES OF BELIEF (Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri eds., 2009). 
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each of which is assigned a possibility value, then 
 
pos(A) = max pos(α) 
α ε A 
 
When the possibility of A attains the maximum possible value 
(perfectly possible, normalized to 1), it does not entail that the possibility of 
not-A is minimized, i.e., 0.  That is, it is not necessarily the case that pos(A) 
+ pos(not-A) = 1.36 This is a central distinction between probability and 
possibility.  Possibility theory is about belief measures that are “non-
additive” in this sense.  As a result, to adequately describe a person’s 
epistemic situation under possibility theory, one needs to know two things: 
not just the person’s assessment of the possibility that a proposition is true, 
but also the person’s assessment of the possibility that the proposition is 
false.  The latter may not simply be derived from the former by a direct 
calculation.  Again, the same point applies to potential surprise: a full 
description of a person’s doxastic state with reference to an event must 
include both the potential surprise if the event is true and the potential 
surprise if the event is false.37 
These abstractions may be somewhat more digestible by way of an 
illustration of the different dynamics of probability and possibility/surprise 
measures.  The first graphic that follows compares the situation of 
“equipoise” in a civil case and how this might be reflected in the strength of 
the probability measures (denoted (Pr(ꞏ)) and possibility /surprise measures 
for the claim, C, and against the claim (for the negation of the claim), not-C: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 36  Indeed, for any A, if pos(A) < 1, then pos(not-A) = 1.  This is because the most 
plausible event, normalized to have a possibility of 1, must lie somewhere; if not in A, then it 
must be in not-A. (Some scholars use an axiom system that would require an additional 
condition on this implication, namely, that pos(Ø) < 1.  This condition excludes the possibility 
that the most plausible event had not been contemplated and, thus, lay in neither A nor not-A, 
but rather in Ø. See Donald Katzner, Potential Surprise, Potential Confirmation, and 
Probability, 9 J. POST KEYNESIAN ECON. 58 (1986).  
 37  If sur(A) represents the surprise function value for a collection of stories, A, then sur(A) 
= 1 – pos(A).  Accordingly: 
sur(A) = min sur(α) 
α ε A 
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Now imagine that evidence favoring the claim is introduced.  The 
effect under a probability measure will be to increase the probability of C 
and to decrease the probability of not-C, as indicated on the left of the second 
graphic.  (The numbers used are merely illustrative, though they must sum 
to 1.0.)  But using possibility measures, the effect will not increase the 
possibility of C; this measure is already as high as it may go.  Rather, the 
effect of such evidence is to drive down the possibility of not-C.  (Put in 
terms of surprise, such evidence cannot decrease sur(C); it may only increase 
sur(not-C).)38 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 38  Again, the numbers used are merely illustrative.  In particular, I am not asserting 
anything about the quantitative relationship between changes in probability and changes in 
possibility measures.  However, it is the case that sur(not-C) = 1 –pos(not-C). 
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So how does this relate to Michael’s proposal?  Although Michael 
does not talk about the two-parameter feature of possibility theory (or 
potential surprise theory), it seems to be embedded in his proposal.  As 
above, let C (for “claim”) represent what Michael calls the “factual 
proposition or complex of propositions” at issue—for example, the 
proposition that the defendant committed the alleged crime.  (Think of this 
as the collection of all stories that, if true, would instantiate the offense with 
which the defendant is charged.)  Then, inspection of Michael’s proposed 
scale of potential surprise reveals that the fact-finder’s potential surprise at 
C being true is the focus of one half of the spectrum, with the extreme points 
being “absolute falsity” of C on one end and equipoise on the other.  But on 
the other half of the spectrum, ending at the point “absolute truth” of C, the 
focus shifts: it seems, instead, to be concerned with the potential surprise at 
discovering not-C.  Put in the language of possibility theory, the former end 
of the scale measures pos(C), with an extreme point where C is impossible 
(pos(C) = 0), while the latter end of the scale measures pos(not-C), with an 
extreme point where not-C is impossible (pos(not-C) = 0). 
This invites two questions.  What happens to pos(C) when one 
moves into the latter portion of the scale?  And conversely, what happens to 
pos(not-C) when one moves into the former portion of the scale?  A possible 
answer to what Michael has in mind comes from possibility theory: pos(C) 
reaches its maximum (normalized to 1) at what Michael calls equipoise and 
remains at 1 for the rest of the scale.  Similarly, pos(not-C) increases as one 
moves in the opposite direction on the scale, reaching its maximum of 1 at 
equipoise and remaining there.  Thus, Michael’s scale seems to be two 
possibility scales superimposed.  Here is an abbreviated form of the two 
possibility scales I think are embedded in Michael’s single scale, reducing 
the number of divisions on each scale (from 15 to 7) for simplicity and to 
facilitate comparison with the probability scale presented earlier: 
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0-------------|--------------|--------------1----------------------------------------------------------1 
 
 
Slightest 
Possibility 
of C 
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Perfect 
Possibility 
of C 
 
Perfect 
Possibility 
of C 
 
1----------------------------------------------------------1--------------|---------------|------------0 
 
 
Perfect 
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Perfect 
Possibility 
of not-C 
 
Perfect 
Possibility 
of not-C 
 
Perfect 
Possibility 
of not-C 
 
Substantial 
Possibility 
of not-C 
 
 
Reasonable 
Possibility 
of not-C 
 
Slightest 
Possibility 
of not-C 
 
The first scale obviously represents, from left to right, an increasing pos(C); 
the second scale represents, from right to left, an increasing pos(not-C).  
Superimposed, these scales yield the following: 
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Here is the same scale roughly translated into potential surprise, denoted as 
sur(C) and sur(not-C): 
sur(C) 
 
1-------------|---------------|--------------0---------------------------------------------------------0 
 
 
C 
extremely 
surprising 
——- 
not-C not 
in the least 
surprising 
 
C 
moderately 
surprising 
——- 
not-C not in 
the least 
surprising 
 
C 
somewhat 
surprising 
——- 
not-C not 
in the least 
surprising 
 
C not in 
the least 
surprising 
——- 
not-C not 
in the 
least 
surprising 
 
C not in 
the least 
surprising 
——- 
not-C 
somewhat 
surprising 
 
C not in 
the least 
surprising 
——- 
not-C 
moderately 
surprising 
 
C not in the 
least 
surprising 
——- 
not-C 
extremely 
surprising 
 
0-----------------------------------------------------------0------------|---------------|-------------1 
 
sur(not-C) 
 
Perhaps this is not where Michael is headed, even if we refine the scale to 15 
distinct levels, as Michael has it, rather than the simpler 7 illustrated here. 
He does not emphasize the shift in focus from sur(C) to sur(not-C), and the 
labeling of the segments of his proposed scale does suggest that there is only 
a single epistemic measure involved, one that is steadily increasing (or 
decreasing) from one end of the scale to the other.  This is not the case in my 
version.  But if I am correct about what Michael is trying to do, or if it is 
what he would endorse upon further reflection, there are several things to 
notice. 
This picture makes sense in Shackle’s way of looking at things.  At 
any point in the process of assessing evidence, the fact-finder whose partial 
beliefs conform to possibility theory must have a doxastic state that can be 
represented on this scale. In particular, the scales of sur(C) and sur(not-C) 
do not need to be “orthogonal” (like Cartesian coordinates) rather than 
“superimposed” in order to reflect all the conceivable possibilities: it cannot 
be that both sur(C) and sur(not-C) are greater than 0, so those pairs of 
potential values need not be represented.39 
In the pivotal central cell, both C and not-C are perfectly possible, 
not in the least surprising.  According to Shackle, this is entirely coherent.  
His view was that an outcome is perfectly possible when there is no 
discernible obstacle to it being or becoming true.40  Here is an example of 
the kind of situation he had in mind: 
 
 
 39  See supra note 36.  
 40  A perfectly possible hypothesis is “entirely unobstructed, wholly free . . . of any 
threatened interference.” G.L.S. Shackle, The Bounds of Unknowledge, in BUSINESS, TIME 
AND THOUGHT 86 (Stephen F. Frowen ed., 1988). 
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An opaque urn contains 100 balls, each of which may be black or 
white; you have and can acquire no further information about the 
color of the balls until after you draw one.  What do you believe 
about the proposition that the ball you draw from the urn will be 
white? 
 
This is an example in which one’s belief about the drawn ball being white is 
based on so little information that it is hard to form any partial belief on 
whether the ball to be drawn will be white.  And the same is true of a partial 
belief that the ball will be black.  Shackle described the situation as one in 
which the potential surprise associated with either outcome is 0, or in the 
language of possibility theory, pos(white) = pos(black) = 1.  That is, both 
drawing a white ball and drawing a black ball are perfectly possible.  Of 
course, if a party to a lawsuit were burdened to prove that the ball to be drawn 
is white, understandably there would be a failure of proof, and the burdened 
party should lose.  This is one way to understand “equipoise,” and sure 
enough, Michael labels this central portion of the scale “functional 
equipoise.” 
        But the meaning of “perfectly possible” is not always so obvious. 
Consider the following example: 
 
An opaque urn contains 100 balls, 80 white and 20 black; you have 
and can acquire no further information about the color of the balls 
until after you draw one.  What would you believe about the 
proposition that the ball you draw from the urn will be white? 
 
Under these conditions, is it perfectly possible that the ball to be 
drawn will be white?  Is it perfectly possible that the ball to be drawn 
will be black?  Scholars familiar with Shackle’s theory debate which 
of the following accounts is correct: 
 
 By one account, there is no discernible obstacle to obtaining 
a white ball and there is no discernible obstacle to obtaining 
a black one, so each outcome is perfectly possible.41  (This 
would place the situation in functional equipoise.) 
 
 By another account, the fact that one outcome is more 
probable than another implies that there is a discernible 
 
 41  Cf. Jochen Runde, Shackle on Probability, in ECONOMICS AS AN ART OF THOUGHT: 
ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF G.L.S. SHACKLE 226 (Peter E. Earl & Stephen F. Frowen eds., 2000) 
(“Compare the toss of a fair coin with the toss of a fair die.  The outcomes of a head and an 
ace are both perfectly possible on Shackle’s definition, although the respective probabilities 
are different.”).   
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obstacle in the way of obtaining the latter, so the former 
must be assigned a higher possibility, and the latter cannot 
be perfectly possible.42  (This would remove the situation 
from functional equipoise.) 
 
 By a third account, the presence of black balls is a 
discernible obstacle to drawing a white ball, just as the 
presence of white balls is a discernible obstacle to drawing 
a black ball, so that neither is perfectly possible, though 
drawing a white ball has a higher possibility than drawing a 
black one.43  (This would also remove the situation from 
functional equipoise.) 
 
To be sure, this is not the kind of decision context for which possibility 
theory was designed, because probability-based decisions are easily applied.  
But it is disconcerting that no clearly correct answer to such a simple 
problem is available under possibility theory or the theory of potential 
surprise.44 
        If clarification of this idea of complete possibility (or, the complete 
absence of surprise) is to be obtained, I suspect it will be found in fuller 
elaboration of the notion that this occurs when “no obstacle” to the 
proposition being true is discernible.  Professor Ho puts the matter this way: 
“By ‘potential surprise’, Shackle means the surprise which runs counter to 
our expectation.  This is different from the surprise that is felt upon encounter 
of novelty, or the unexpected.”45  In other words, to run counter to 
expectations, and thus to produce surprise, one must have expectations about 
something being true or happening.  In the absence of expectations, there is 
zero surprise and maximum possibility.  And where do expectations come 
from? Answer: experience with how things generally or normally work.  This 
could be connected, then, to one of numerous presumptive reasoning theories 
that use patterns of normalcy, subject to defeasing conditions, to characterize 
 
 42  See J.L. FORD, CHOICE, EXPECTATION AND UNCERTAINTY: AN APPRAISAL OF G.L.S. 
SHACKLE’S THEORY 72 (1983) (“To hold that the one outcome is more likely than the other 
must imply that there is an obstacle in the way of the other outcome’s occurring. Therefore, 
it must be assigned a higher degree of potential surprise than the one outcome.”).  
 43  See H.L. HO, A PHILOSOPHY OF EVIDENCE LAW: JUSTICE IN THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH 
147 (2008).  This account violates the usual axioms of possibility theory, for it cannot 
simultaneously be the case that neither C nor not-C is perfectly possible, unless perhaps the 
most plausible story has not been contemplated as a possibility, so that it falls within neither 
C nor not-C.  See supra note 36.  Still, Professor Ho’s argument is an intelligible reading of 
Shackle’s criterion of perfect possibility, which reveals a tension that is inherent in the theory. 
 44  Of course, the same may be said for probability-based decisions in law. The balls in 
an urn problem is just another metaphor for so-called “naked statistical evidence” cases.  See 
HO, supra note 43, at 135–43. 
 45   Id. at 147 (emphasis in original).   
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epistemic justification.46  (For example: normally, in a certain situation (i.e., 
given certain evidence), one is warranted in believing p, unless d1, d2, or d3; 
if, for example, d1, then one is not normally warranted in believing p, unless 
d1a or d1b; and so forth.) The problem with such theories is that they end up 
as theories of categorical belief, which Michael has so far not endorsed as 
controlling in adjudication and which pose serious problems once one comes 
to grips with the need to synthesize partial beliefs about the presence of 
defeasing conditions into an overall gradational measure of epistemic 
warrant.47 
On the other hand, the model suggested above has some promising 
features.  First, the fact that there are two variables of interest at least starts 
us on a path that might ultimately present a solution to what Michael 
recognizes as a vexing problem: “how to get some sort of relative weight out 
of what starts out as an ordinal system.”48  The resulting scheme would bear 
a strong resemblance to the theory advanced by Hoc Lai Ho in his 2008 
monograph.  Discussing Shackle’s idea of potential surprise, Ho concludes 
as follows: 
 
To believe that p, we must not only think that p is perfectly 
possible, we must also think that none of its contradictories is 
perfectly possible.  How strongly one believes that p in that 
situation will depend on the possibility of p relative to the 
possibility of the strongest of the contradictories.49 
 
Moving from the left to the right on my superimposed scales involves just 
this two-part test: if the strength of the evidence causes the fact-finder’s 
doxastic state to reach equipoise, one is assured that the claim, C, is perfectly 
possible.  If the strength of the evidence moves the doxastic state beyond 
equipoise, it at least becomes meaningful to talk in terms of an increasing 
ratio of pos(C)/pos(not-C), and thus potentially to talk in terms of such a 
ratio exceeding a target value r, where r ≥ 1.50  Obviously, more needs to be 
done here to complete such a theory, but there is potential. 
 
 46  See, e.g., Martin Smith, What Else Justification Could Be, 44 NOÛS 10 (2010). 
 47  See NANCE, supra note 2, at 137–47.  It might be relatively unproblematic if this 
difficulty could be cabined off, confronted only in the context of delimiting the category of 
equipoise, but it is not easy to see how this can be done, given that every point on the spectrum 
is characterized by at least one of the variables having the value of “perfectly possible.”  
Moreover, outside of equipoise, one of the variables is less than perfectly possible, and a 
degree of possibility must be associated with a degree of obstacles to truth. 
 48  Risinger, supra note 1, at 981 n.49.  
 49  HO, supra note 43, at 148.  Professor Ho invokes Shackle to support his categorical 
belief model of adjudicative fact-finding.  As already indicated, I do not think a categorical 
belief model works.  See supra note 13. 
 50  It should be obvious that I make no claim to the effect that a fact-finder’s doxastic 
state must move continuously along this scale, even if possibility theory effectively models 
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        Possibility theory also articulates another idea, the “necessity” of an 
event.  As explained above, the possibility of the truth lying within a 
collection of stories, A, is identified with the most plausible story in the 
collection.  This means that the possibility of not-A is identified with the 
most plausible story not within A.  This maximizing measure of not-A in turn 
permits a measure of the certainty or necessity of A, as the complement of 
the possibility of not-A.  That is, nec(A) = 1 – pos(not-A).  If one defines the 
collection of stories satisfying the claim, C, as those satisfying both a 
proposition A and a proposition B, then one striking fact is that this measure 
has the following property: 
 
nec(C) = nec(A and B) = min [nec(A), nec(B)] 
 
If one thinks of A and B as the elements of the claim, C, then this property 
provides a potential solution to the so-called conjunction paradox, or 
problem of the conjunction, that is thought by some (not including me) to be 
a serious embarrassment to thinking in terms of probabilistic standards of 
proof.51  If the standards of proof are set in terms of necessity measures, then 
whether that standard has been met as to the claim, C, can be determined 
entirely by assessing whether it has been met as to each of A and B.  Unlike 
a probability measure, nes(C) can never be less than the smaller of nes(A) 
and nes(B).  Necessity thus has a structure like the idea of inductive support 
that Jonathan Cohen proposed some time ago in an effort to solve this (and 
other) supposed paradoxes.52 
        This works rather nicely with the superimposed scale described above.  
On the left-hand side of the scale, one need not worry about nec(C) because 
the obvious obstacle preventing a verdict favoring the claimant (the party 
asserting C) is the fact that C is not perfectly possible.  But once this 
condition is satisfied, attention shifts to the right-hand side of the scale, 
where the epistemic action focuses on sur(not-C).  And the surprise function 
has the same property described above for necessity, for the simple reason 
that nec(A) = 1 – pos(not-A) = sur(not-A).  Consequently, in deciding the 
second part of the two-part test for a verdict, one can use the property: 
 
sur(not-C) = nec(C) = nec(A and B) = min [nec(A), nec(B)] 
= min [sur(not-A), sur(not-B)] 
 
that fact-finder’s partial beliefs.  I am simply using movement along the scale as a way of 
explaining what the scale represents. 
 51  For extended recent discussions of the problem compatible with a probabilistic 
understanding of the standards of proof, see David S. Schwartz & Elliott R. Sober, The 
Conjunction Problem and the Logic of Jury Findings, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 619 (2017); 
Mark Spottswood, Unraveling the Conjunction Paradox, 15 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 259 
(2016). 
 52  See L. JONATHAN COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE (1977). 
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Verbally, if a verdict favoring C is appropriate only if not-C would be 
sufficiently surprising by a designated standard, and if C consists of multiple 
elements, and if the fact-finder can identify the element that would be least 
surprising if false, then, in order to give a positive verdict on the claim, the 
fact-finder need only assure itself that that element would be sufficiently 
surprising if false under the designated standard. 
CONCLUSION 
I have gone far enough in suggesting both the problems and the 
intriguing lines of inquiry surrounding possibility /surprise measures as tools 
for interpreting legal standards of proof and what we ask of fact-finders in 
their application.  My main point has been to suggest how formal theory can 
be useful to someone like Michael in his effort to articulate a better way to 
understand adjudicative fact-finding.  Put simply, my message to Michael is 
this: formalism can be your friend, too.  I have found it very instructive to 
pursue Michael’s suggestion by taking a few steps toward the articulation of 
a coherent conception of the standards of proof using possibility theory.  Of 
course, Michael may not choose to go this direction, but he will need to 
choose a direction for the development of his idea. 
My initial conclusion is that the use of surprise as a measure of 
uncertainty pertinent to adjudicative fact-finding faces several obstacles.  
The first is descriptive: do fact-finders think in terms of potential surprise?  
It is rather difficult to see a confirmation of Shackle’s idea in the interesting 
empirical data that Matt Ginther and Ed Cheng provide for us at this 
Symposium.  My sur(C) is their surprise(guilty), while my sur(not-C) is their 
surprise(innocent).  In the responses of subjects, we do not see clearly 
various properties that we would expect to see from Shackle-style surprise 
measures.  First, as one moves from the weakest evidence for the claim to 
equipoise, surprise(innocent) should be 0 throughout the range, while 
surprise(guilty), always higher than surprise(innocent), should gradually fall 
to 0.  Second, at equipoise, both surprise (innocent) and surprise(guilty) 
should be essentially 0.  Third, as the evidence becomes yet more favorable 
to the prosecution, surprise(guilty) should remain 0 throughout the range 
past equipoise, while surprise(innocent) should rise gradually over the range 
from 0 toward 1.  Rather than these patterns, Ginther and Cheng’s data 
suggest that, without tutelage, respondents are inclined to understand 
surprise as something more like the complement of probability than like the 
complement of possibility, at least when a quantitative response scale is 
employed.53 
 
 
 53  See Ginther & Cheng, supra note 16, at 1087–90 figs. 1–4 (showing data plots). 
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The second set of obstacles is prescriptive.  If ordinary people 
serving as fact-finders use surprise as the complement of probability, it is 
difficult to see that much is gained from switching terminology from one to 
the other, and there will certainly be transaction costs associated with such a 
change.  If, instead, we want fact-finders to think in terms of Shackle-style 
surprise, then a real change might result, but an educative process would be 
required, and it is even harder to see how that could be worth the costs of the 
effort.  Moreover, I have already noted the problems associated with 
identifying levels of moral justification with particular levels of potential 
surprise.  That project must somehow explain the connection between levels 
of required proof and the costs of errors, both false positives and false 
negatives, beyond merely the observation that setting the level of acceptable 
risk of such errors is the (perhaps unintended) consequence of a moral 
justification that is developed without regard to them. 
Finally, both the descriptive and prescriptive aspects of Michael’s 
proposal require at least some effort to think through the analytical problems 
associated with surprise measures.  In particular, if Shackle’s model or the 
subsequently and more elaborately developed possibility theory is to form 
the basis of Michael’s suggestion, greater clarity is needed about the logic of 
surprise.  Especially important is the central idea of “completely possible” 
(or “completely unsurprising”) events, without which the important idea of 
equipoise is left rather shrouded in mystery. 
One final thought: I am immensely grateful to Michael for his 
consistent creativity and insight over the years, not to mention his 
collegiality.  I trust his retirement from teaching will not mean an end to his 
contributions to the field of evidence.  His work always inspires—and 
usually convinces.  I hope to see much more. 
 
